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Nixon: The National Environmental Policy Act's Influence on Standing, Ju

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT'S
INFLUENCE ON STANDING, JUDICIAL REVIEW,
AND RETROACTIVITY*
Congressman Saylor said that Senate Bill 1075, which
became the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) 1 on January 1, 1970, "is a landmark in the history
of conservation legislation." 2 Whether or not the Act has
been a landmark is debatable, but it has managed to reach
"every branch of the Government,"' including the judicial
branch. NEPA has provided broad environmental goals to
preserve a healthful and aesthetically pleasing environment
with maximum beneficial use development Preservation and
development must be the responsibility of the federal, state
and local governments with cooperation from concerned public
and private organizations. Section 102 lists agency directives
to implement these goals.' The Act provides that the impact
on man's environment must be studied through natural and
social sciences and environmental design arts. Recommendation of major Federal actions must be preceded by an environmental impact statement prepared by agencies with legal
jurisdiction or special expertise. This statement will be submitted to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality, and the public. Accompanying a recommendation
should be a detailed statement on the following:
(1) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(3) alternatives to the proposed action;
(4) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
*

1.
2.
8.
4.
5.

This comment was partially financed by the Water Resources Research
Institute of the University of Wyoming.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §§ 101-105, 201-205, 83 Stat.
(Herein852, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47) (1970).
after referred to as NEPA.)
115 CONG. REC. 40925 (1969) (remarks of Congressman Saylor).
115 CONG. REC. 40928 (1969) (remarks and opinion of Congressman
Harsha).
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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(5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be in the proposed action
should it be implemented.'
Also provided for is a Council on Environmental Quality
which must compile information, recommend to the President
environmental changes and assist him in an annual report to
Congress. 7 Environmentalists may have hoped such broad
coverage would have eliminated their struggle for standing
to appeal from agency action and for judicial review in seeking injunctions against agencies. To gain standing prior to
the passage of NEPA, an individual or environmental group
needed to show a legally protected environmental interest and
not merely a property interest.' NEPA altered these problems and posed a new one, i.e., the possibility the Act would
not retroactively apply. The purpose of this comment is to
consider the problems of standing, judicial review of agencies,
and retroactive application facing conservation groups before
and after the NEPA's enactment.
STANDING

Before NEPA's enactment, standing was not guaranteed
to a conservationist or conservation group unless they had an
economic interest or were joined with a local interest. An interested national group would probably be denied standing.
Three important cases demonstrate the law of standing prior
to NEPA.
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission9 a local conservation group and local towns
were able to prevent the FPC's issuance of a license for a
hydropower plant until alternatives to the project were considered. The court held that the Federal Power Act 1" gave the
petitioners a right to protect their special interests. The court
said it would have allowed standing without the Federal
Power Act since an "aggrieved" party under the "case" or
"controversy" requirement of Article III, section 2, of the
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 608.
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-93, 795-97, 798-818, 820-25v (1970).
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Federal Constitution need not have a personal economic interest." However, this language was dictum since the parties
involved had economic interests. The towns had private property interests which would have been injured by transmission
lines, and the conservation group was organized by a group
which had seventeen miles of trailways in the project area."
Since the dictum showed a recognition of conservation interests, the decision may have been a victory of sorts for conservation groups, but it was not a substantial one.
In another major case, the court in Data Processing Service v. Camp" in dictum said:
[T] he Administrative Procedure Act grants standing
to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." 4 That interest, at
and rectimes, may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational,
15
reational' as well 'as economic values.'
Plaintiffs here too, though not conservationists, were injured
in fact economically.' 6
The court in Sierra Club v. Hickel7 denied standing to
the Sierra Club, a non-profit organization, which asked for a
declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions to block permits for a highway to be constructed
through Sequoia National Park and a commercial-recreational
development in and near Mineral King Valley in Sequoia
National Forest."5 The court in distinguishing Scenic Hudson
stated "[t]hat there [was] no such Statute [Federal Power
Act] involved in the present case to give standing."' 9 While
noting the non-economic provisions for standing in DataProcessing, the court said that the plaintiffs here were not "aggrieved" and that they would not be affected even though the
actions would be distasteful to them.'" The court required the
conservation groups to have a local interest or to be joined
11. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, supra note 8, at 615.
12. Id.
13. Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1964), as quoted in Data Processing Serv. v.
Camp, supra note 13, at 153-54.
15. Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, supra note 13, at 153-54.
16. Id. at 152.
17. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. Id. at 27.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Id. at 33.
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with local residents for standing. The court in Sierra Club v.
Hickel took a rather strained position by not considering
27,000 Sierra Club members as local residents. Even though
these members had resided in San Francisco, they had taken
a special interest in the Sierra Nevadas. Arguably this interest could be considered a sufficient local interest to qualify
the member for standing.2 1 This, however, did not prevail,
and thus in Sierra Club v. Hickel plaintiffs without an economic interest were denied standing. Neither were they given
standing under NEPA, which had been passed earlier in 1970.
Perhaps this was because plaintiffs had not claimed standing
under NEPA, and the court declined to refer to it.
The legislative history of NEPA demonstrates congressional awareness of the conservationists' plight in regard to
standing. Senate bill 1075,2" as passed by the Senate, stated
that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to
a healthful environment." 2 3 It was amended in conference to
state that "each person should enjoy a healthful environment."4 Although the resulting language was weaker, arguably Congress still intended to provide the individual with an
environmental interest which should be legally protected.
Senator Jackson, who sponsored the bill, intended that an individual should be able to protect his right to a healthful environment and stated he would propose an amendment to
clarify the provision. An amendment was also added under
Section 101(a) so that "public and private organizations"
should have a responsibility to ensure a healthful environment.2 6
Arguably Congress by these sections intended to give an
individual or public organization a non-economic interest in
a healthful environment. Congress provided environmental
groups a basis for standing if courts chose to follow it. Perhaps through broader language Congress gave courts wider
discretion to grant standing.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

Note, Concern of Conservationist Group Held Not Sufficient to Confer
Standing To Challenge Agency Action, 71 COLUM. L. REY. 172, 175 (1971).
S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
115 CONG. REC. 40415 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
Id.
Id. at 40416.
115 CONG. REC. 39702 (1969).
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A rash of decisions has followed NEPA's enactment. Virtually all have granted standing to conservation groups and
individual conservationists under NEPA." Probably the most
significant decision for environmentalists was Environmental
Defense Fund,Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army.28 Plaintiffs were non-profit corporations from New
York and Arkansas and several individuals. Plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the making of a contract or any work in furtherance
of the Gilham Dam Project over the Cassatot River in Arkansas. No construction had begun on the Gilham Dam, which
was a part of a larger project, the Milwood Reservoir and
Alternate Reservoir, Little River, Oklahoma and Arkansas.
The total project was two-thirds complete.29 The court granted
the plaintiffs standing, stating that it would rely on the rationale of the Scenic Hudson and DataProcessing cases, even
though the language there was dicta. " Whether or not the
court would have given standing on the basis of those cases
alone is difficult to say, since it was able to supply standing
under NEPA. The court said Congress intended to give private organizations a role to further the Act."'
As indicated by the majority of cases decided after
NEPA, the standing problem is practically non-existent for
conservation groups. Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett" summarized the holdings by saying:
[I]f the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic and
scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Alameda Conservation Ass'n. v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States
Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.
Ark. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of
United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Ark. 1971). (The foregoing
cases are separate memo decisions and henceforth shall be referred to as
one case.) Sierra Club v. Hardin, Civil No. A-16-70 (D. Alas., March 25,
1971), 2 ENV. REP. 1385; Cape May County Izaak Walton League v.
Macchia, 40 U.S.L.W. 2001 (D.N.J. June 16, 1971); Brooks v. Volpe, 319
F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond,
318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Wilderness Soc'y v.
Hickel, No. 928-70 (D.D.C. April 23, 1970), 1 ENV. REP. 1335.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States
Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Pennsylvania Environment Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970).
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give standing to groups interested in these factors and
who allege that these factors are not being properly
considered by the agency."
The court in Sierra Club v. Hardin4 recognized that the
policy behind allowing class actions is the sanction of meritorious actions which would otherwise be denied.35 A small
number of individuals or one individual alone would not have
the funds to sustain a suit for which no damages are given.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Before NEPA's enactment one major case, Parker v.
6 granted judicial review of agency action when
United States,"
a statute fixed guidelines for the agency to follow." However,
if unfortunate plaintiffs had no statute upon which to rely, the
court could not ensure full consideration of environmental
values. In Parker, conservation groups and local residents
sought a declaratory judgment that a timber sale was unlawful. They also sought to enjoin the Government from selling
timber until investigations were made regarding the propriety of the sale under the Wilderness Act. 8 The court granted
standing. The court then held that even though the Secretary
of Agriculture had the discretion to sell the timber, he must
first consider the relative values of various resources. Whether "the Secretary made this consideration is a matter that
the Court can review."3

9

The legislative history of NEPA shows that judicial review could apply to the Act. The conference committee added
to Section 102 the provision that all federal agencies should
comply with Section 102 "to the fullest extent possible."" The
conference report interpreted the language to mean that "no
agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its
existing statutory authorization to avoid compliance." 4 ' Even
33. Id. at 245.
34. Sierra Club v. Hardin, Civil No. A-16-70 (D. Alas., March 25, 1971).
35.

Id. at 1404, 2 ENV. REP. 1385.

Parker v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 40
U.S.L.W. 2202 (10th Cir. 1971).
37. Id.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1131-36 as referred to in Parker v. United States supra note 36,
at 687.
39. Parker v. United States, supra note 36, at 688.
40. 115 CONG. REC. 39703 (1969).
41. Id.
36.
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though an agency would have discretion to make a final decision, a court might require an agency to submit an indefinite
amount of material, according to the phrase "to the fullest extent possible." A court's power could be arbitrarily exercised.
After NEPA's enactment in two of the latest cases, the
courts have used their judicial review power to require agencies to consider further environmental impacts and alternatives. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. the court held
that the defendants did not comply fully with Section 102(c)
since statements did not set forth all the environmental effects,
alernatives, irreversible and irretrievable commitments, and
comments and views of all appropriate state and local agencies."2 Although the court may have been requiring compliance
with the Act, arguably the court was exercising discretion
under the guise of judicial review. The court could prevent
project progression merely by deciding that one more alternative course must be considered.
In other decisions, the courts have been willing to require
agencies to satisfy the directives under Section 102. To what
extent these are satisfied, however, is discretionary with the
courts. In Wilderness Society v. Hickel," the Secretary of
the Interior was found to have failed to meet all the procedural requirements of NEPA with respect to the application
for an oil pipe line right-of-way." As a result, he was enjoined from issuing a permit. He was ordered to file a detailed statement, but what the statement was required to say
was not specified.
However, in Sierra Club v. Hardin the court determined
that the completed research and planning were sufficient to
satisfy NEPA's requirements."5 Courts have inconsistently
required agencies to conform "to the fullest extent possible."
Thus environmentalists are not guaranteed any specified result and sometimes no substantial result, even though judicial
review is granted.
42. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States
Army, supra note 28, at 758.
43. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, No. 928-70 (D.D.C. April 23, 1970), 1 ENV.
REP. 1335.
44. Id. at 1337.
45. Sierra Club v. Hardin, supra note 34, at 1404.
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NEPA

A third problem which faced conservationists was whether NEPA would retroactively apply. An agency's project
might have begun before the restrictive act was passed. If so,
as a general proposition, retroactivity will not apply unless
that application was the "manifest intention of the legislature. "4
Although the legislative history of the Act itself does
not mention possible retroactive application, the Council of
Environmental Quality issued guidelines on April 30, 1970."7
These state that to the "maximum extent practicable" the Act
should be applied to major federal actions, even though the
projects may have been initiated prior to January 1, 1970.48
If it will not be possible to "reassess the basic course of action", still, actions should minimize adverse environmental
consequences.49 However, in spite of these guidelines, most
courts have denied retroactive application."
One case which allowed retroactive application was the
EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Inc. case. Even though $9,496,000 had been expended on the project, which was estimated
would ultimately cost $14,800,000,"' the court did not handle
the retroactivity question with kid gloves. Although the court
found nothing specific in the legislative history about retroactivity, the court said that from NEPA's language a retroactive application was intended. The court cited Section
101(a) regarding the "continuing policy of the federal government" to protect the environment and Section 102 which
requires the agencies to follow the section to "the fullest extent possible." The court said these passages, coupled with
the interim guidelines, could not be ignored.2
46. Union Pacific R.R. v. Laramie Stockyards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913).
47. Guidelines For Federal Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy
Act, Fed. Laws Vol., ENV. REP. 71:0301 (1970).
48. Id. at 71:0304.
49. Id.
50. Cape May County Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 40 U.S.L.W. 2001
(D.N.J. June 16, 1971); Siera Club v. Hardin, supra note 34; Brooks v.
Volpe, 1319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Investment Syndicates, Inc.
v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Ore. 1970).
51. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States
Army, supra note 28, at 744.
52. Id.
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Although a conservation group has gained standing and
although judicial review has been applied, environmental
factors may not be considered under NEPA because the Act
may not retroactively apply to a contested project. Several
cases have emphatically said the NEPA will not so apply.
Brooks v. Volpe" followed precedent and did not allow a
retroactive application unless the Act's language clearly indicates Congress so intended. Sierra Club v. Hardindid not allow a retroactive application and only expressed qualms when
it said:
The rule that N.E.P.A. should not be given retroactive effect to frustrate activities to which the Government had committed itself prior to the passage of
the Act is, in principle, sound . . . The difficult
question involves pinpointing that moment in time
when the Federal Government can be said to have
committed itself."
The decision in Investment Syndicate, Inc. v. Richmond5
denying retroactivity was based on the percentage of completion of a project on the date NEPA was enacted. In his
opinion the judge stated:
I cannot believe that Congress intended that the
NEPA apply to 'major Federal actions' which had
reached this stage of completion as of the date of
enactment. It was not the intention of Congress to
negate all of the work which had gone into this project."
The conclusion of most of the courts has been to ignore
the interim guidelines and to deny retroactive application.
The decisions and the trend thereby developed have impeded
the progress environmentalists have made through gaining
standing and judicial review. However, denial of retroactivity
will only apply to those projects begun before NEPA's enactment and these will be limited. Even if a conservation group
were given standing and even if every impact statement,
which included every alternative, was filed, environmentalists
53.
54.
55.
56.

Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90, 92 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
Sierra Club v. Hardin, supra note 34, at 1403-04 n. 52.
Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Ore. 1970).
Id. at 1039.
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are not guaranteedenvironment preservation.2 The Act only
requires consideration of environmental factors. If the goal
of the environmentalist has been to preserve the environment
in status quo form, this goal is not guaranteed by NEPA.
SUNNY

J.

NIXON

57. Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep In Wolf's Clothing?
37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139, 150 (1970).
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